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Employees are not passive recipients of the decisions at the work place, but are active players in influencing decisions, especially those decisions which are related to their self interests (Ferris & Judge, 1991). There has been a lot of research on the manager s attempts to influence subordinate, called downward influence, to accomplish the organizational goals. Leadership research is one example of this stream of research. In the last twenty years or so, research has also focused more attention on the question of „managing your boss (Gabarro & Kotter, 1980) or subordinate s upward influence attempts to achieve personal or organizational goals. This research can be divided into two parts; one identifying the situational, leader, and subordinate related antecedents of the upward influence tactics (e.g., Ansari & Kapoor, 1987; Kumar, 1990), and the second studying the consequences of upward influence attempts (e.g., Gardner & Martinko, 1988). This paper focuses on the latter issue, and specifically on managerial decision making. That is, it discusses following: what is the effect of upward influence tactics on managerial decision making? And how does this effect takes place? The paper analyses above issues with reference to manager-subordinate dyad in the context of subordinate s personal or organizational goals.

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with the environment. Thus both views of the organizations- closed and open, should be considered in combination, and not alone, to resolve contentious issues. Both forms are evident in complex organizations (Thompson, 1967).

In accordance with the open system view, Pfeffer (1981) conceptualized organizations as political entities as against mere rational entities, and stated that, “politics involved how differing preferences are resolved in conflicts over the allocation of scarce resources” (p.6). Also, political activities are

Organization politics manifest at different organization levels. It may be exercised at inter-organizational levels, at intra-organizational levels e.g. between departments, or at individual levels e.g. supervisor-subordinate dyads. In this paper we focus on last form of OP variously termed as influence tactics, and impression management. Influence tactics represents political behavior which people at work use to influence their colleagues, subordinates or superiors to obtain personal benefits or to fulfill organizational goals (Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980). Influence tactics can be exercised in upward, downward and lateral directions. Upward influence behavior, the focus of current paper, refers to the manager-subordinate dyadic level and is defined as “attempts to influence someone in formal hierarchy of authority in organization” (Liden & Mitchell, 1988, p.572). Like other forms of political behaviors, UI can also take overt or covert forms. For example,

again are of not much interest here, because these are ex-post explanations, which are relatively less political. The last category, i.e. tactical assertive behaviors is the focus of present paper because these are proactively used by employees to influence immediate or short term decisions affecting them (Ferris & Judge, 1991). This is the category which has been extensively investigated as well in the influence literature.

Kipnis et al. (1980); Kipnis & Schmidt (1988); Schriesheim & Hinkin (1990); and Yukl & Falbe (1990) conducted empirical studies and identified following upward influence tactics: assertiveness, ingratiation, rationality, exchange, upward appeal, and coalitions (see table 1 for definitions). Further Yukl & Tracey (1992) and Yukl, Falbe, & Yuon (1993) suggested and found empirical support for more tactics- personal appeal, legitimating, consultation and inspirational appeals. They found that while first two are used in lateral direction, latter two are used in downward direction more often. But their study did not specify the objectives of the tactics – personal or organizational. And it has been found that in case of organizational goals champions use consultation and inspirational appeal tactics for selling issues to top management (Andersson & Bateman, 2000). So these tactics have been included in table 1 as upward tactics. Further development in the field saw Yukl, Chavez, & Seifert (2005) identify and test two more influence tactics, collaboration and apprising. Both were validated as new constructs, but were tested only in downward and lateral direction. And since they are close to exchange and rational persuasion respectively, they haven't been included in the current paper. Out of eight tactics, ingratiation is covert in nature and its success depends on act appearing genuine to the target. All others are more explicit in nature.

Liden & Mitchell (1988), Wayne & Ferris (1990), and Wayne & Liden (1995)

1988). Entitlement involves claiming credit for positive events more than one's contribution. Enhancement is presenting one's own performance in a positive light, enhancing its importance and criticality.

To summarize, UI tactics can be classified under supervisor focused and self promotion tactics. Former includes covert tactics like ingratiation, and more overt tactics like upward appeal, and coalition formation. Latter includes behaviors like entitlements, and enhancements.

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Insert table 1 about here  
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### **UI tactics meta-categories**

Kipnis & Schmidt (1985) suggested three meta-categories – soft, hard, and rationality tactics to classify various UI tactics. These categories were subsequently used and confirmed in many empirical studies (Deluga, 1991; Somech & Drach –Zahavi, 2002; Thacker & Wayne, 1995). Whereas soft tactics are more covert in nature, hard and rationality tactics are more explicit. Kipnis & Schmidt (1983) suggested that past studies invariably found three underlying dimensions of influence tactics- assertive directive tactics, rational tactics, and non directive or manipulative tactics. Kipnis & Schmidt (1985) also identified these meta-categories across distinct decision situations (influence at home used by married couples, and influence used by managers), and cultural contexts (United States, Australia, and Great Britain). “Hard tactics involve demanding, shouting and assertiveness. With soft tactics, people act nice and flatter others to get their way. Rational tactics involve use of logic and bargaining to demonstrate why compliance or compromise is the best solution” (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985, p. 42). Kipnis & Schmidt (1988) cluster analyzed and identified following four categories of managers using different UI approaches – shotguns, ingratiators, tacticians, and bystanders. Shotguns employed multiple UI tactics, but mainly relied on aggressiveness; ingratiators mainly used friendliness tactics; tacticians used reasoning based tactics; and bystanders rarely used UI tactics. Thus shotguns employed hard tactics approach, ingratiators employed soft tactics approach, and tacticians employed rationality approach. This further confirms the statistical validity of the three meta-categories.

Hard tactics are used when agent believes that directive and aggressive behavior can result in target complying with a request. This is more likely to occur when agent has greater power relative to target, and/or agents' objective is organizational rather than personal, and/or agents' expectation of their ability to influence (using soft tactics or rational persuasion) target is low (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985). In case of UI, agent has natural disadvantage due to lesser position/ authority power compared to target. So in this case, agents' depend on other informal sources of

power such as their expertise, or affiliation to coalition like trade union, or close relations with a higher authority, to tilt power equation in their favor. And in absence of such a source, agents are more likely to rely either on rational persuasion and soft tactics. Kipnis & Schmidt (1983, 1985) found in their study that the agents who have more power relative to the targets, used hard tactics more frequently; those who have lesser power, used soft tactics; and when neither party has a real power advantage, rational tactics were used more frequently. Somech & Drach – Zahavi (2002) confirmed above results for soft and hard tactics.





social actors accountable to significant others, e.g. appraisee to appraiser. Appraisees try to influence appraisers through various tactics like opinion conformity, self promotion etc. Then these decisions have high instrumentality, e.g. appraisals are linked to appraisee s salary raise and promotion decisions. Adoption of innovation ideas have been shown to be closely related to

Past studies (e.g. Wayne & Liden, 1995) have confirmed the direct effect of soft tactics on liking, and mediating effect of fit or perceived similarity between soft tactics and liking. Soft tactics like opinion conformity create an impression of compatibility in thinking, values etc in the target with respect to agent. People need to confirm self concepts in the eyes of others, and when agent conforms to the target s opinions,

Rational persuasion or reasoning is another meta-category likely to affect „perception of competence positively. It has been shown to be most effective UI tactic (Bhatnagar, 1993; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). The three mediating variables- liking, perception of fit, and perception of competence, influence the managerial decisions.

The third meta-category, hard UI tactics, draws different reactions from the decision maker. Analyzed from the fit/ liking/ competency framework, hard tactics are more likely to evoke



& Wooldridge (2004) identified similar rational strategic actions used by middle managers to sell ideas to top managers in hospitals.

Based on above discussion it is proposed that, tactics like rational persuasion, coalition formation, and consultation will influence decision maker s perception about the organizational opportunity that agent s proposal presented. The decision maker may also see this as a personal opportunity, because sponsoring a potent idea may advance their careers as well. They may also perceive it to be more beneficial personally than organizationally. This may happen when managers are able to foresee that the idea is beneficial for the organization in short term than in long term. The short term benefits may coincide with their own planned tenure in the organization, a typical moral hazard situation. Inspirational appeals may stir their value salient to the issue raised by agent. On the other hand,



administration. Supervisors avoid taking uncomfortable disciplinary action against those who are close to them (Grote, 1995).

Hard UI tactics also affect ERM decisions through DTP of supervisor. One of the biggest sources of power for a worker is the union membership, which becomes source of dependency threat for supervisor. The threat may be an action by unions against supervisor's interest if subordinate approaches union in the event of supervisor disagreeing to subordinate's request. In UI terminology, using union power means coalition tactic. The most potent source of power in the hands of union is the threat of strike. Another form of power is access with the top management. If the union is strong, then it bargains with management for its influential members on issues related to wages, benefits, grievances, disciplinary issues, and other conditions of employment, and it may even hurt supervisors' interests.

In case of personal goals, the positive effect on fit perception and liking is most likely to cause target's task commitment. Thus ingratiation will cause target's task commitment. Also, rational persuasion may cause target's task commitment through mediation of perception of competence and its positive effect on liking. Rational persuasion may also cause target's compliance through mediation of perception of agent's competence, though target may not necessarily develop liking for rational agent. Hard tactics involve more complex outcomes. While DTP will invoke compliance to agent's demand, simultaneously DTP/hard tactics will develop target's dislike for agent causing resistance to the agent's demand. The stronger of the two effects will determine target's decision to comply or resist the agent's demand.

*Organizational goal context:* In case of organizational decisions, like acceptance of innovation, champions have been found to use multiple influence tactics in upward, downward or lateral directions (Burgelman, 1983; Dean, 1987). But the role of mediating variables discussed in the last section remains untested. The decision maker's response will be similar in this case as well. When they perceive, agent's proposal as an organizational and personal opportunity, they will commit to the decision. If somehow they may perceive that although organization benefits, they may not be benefited from the proposal (e.g. impending retirement),



to it, even when they do not see any personal benefit from it. This happens in issues such as environment, safety etc. The model presents tentative relations as discussed above.

### **COMBINED EFFECT OF UI TACTICS**

The main contribution of the proposed models is the integration of three tactical approaches - soft, hard, and rational persuasion, influencer adopts to achieve personal or organizational goals. The models facilitate studying the effect of combination of UI tactics. UI tactics are used more in combination than individually as isolated influence attempts (Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988). Falbe & Yukl (1992) studied the effect of combination of soft, hard, and rational persuasion attempts, two at a time (single first and a single follow up attempt), on target's task commitment, compliance, and resistance. As expected, they found effectiveness of two soft tactics > soft and rational > one soft only > hard and rational > soft and hard > one rational only > hard and hard > one hard only (second tactic is a follow up tactic if the first is unsuccessful). Effectiveness was measured as target's response - either target's task resistance, or compliance, or task commitment, with effectiveness increasing in that order. It is easy to understand these results as happening due to the intervening variables in the proposed model. For example in case of personal goals, two soft tactics may reinforce target's „liking or „fit perceptions, whereas combination of soft and hard tactic may evoke contradictory target reactions.

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